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PROPERTY ASSESSED CLEAN ENERGY (PACE):
VICTIM OF LOAN GIANTS OR WAY
OF THE FUTURE?
MICHAEL A. WRAPP*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE)
programs provided the citizens of many states and localities with
an affordable means of making energy improvements to their
property. Essentially, PACE programs create a long-term payment mechanism for property owners so that they may pay for
energy improvements gradually as long as they continue to own
their property and reap benefits from them, rather than having
to pay daunting upfront costs for cleaner, more efficient energy.
Shortly after the first PACE program was implemented in Berkeley, California, similar programs and policies rapidly proliferated
throughout the United States. But despite their rapid proliferation and beneficial effects, PACE programs are not without
detractors. In fact, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae), and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) have taken a firm stance against such programs, provoking legal responses from a number of interested parties. Thus
far, a few key decisions are indicative of the disagreement among
federal courts with respect to the viability of PACE programs.
This Note will first examine the spread of energy efficiency
programs in general, as well as the mechanics of PACE programs
in particular. It will proceed to briefly outline the history and
development of PACE programs, from their inception in California to their rapid proliferation throughout the United States.
Next, it will discuss the objections made against these programs
by the FHFA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, as well as the legal
response of PACE supporters. Then, it will analyze the most significant aspects of the various federal court decisions that have
* J.D./MBA Candidate, University of Notre Dame, 2014. I would like to
thank Professor Bruce R. Huber for his guidance and for inspiring me to pursue this particular topic. I would also like to thank the members of the
2011–2012 JLEPP editorial board, especially Erica Kemp and Joshua Bennett,
for their guidance throughout the writing process. Finally, I would like to
thank the members of the 2012-2013 JLEPP editorial board and staff for all of
their hard work during the editing process.
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occurred in recent months. Finally, it will attempt to chart the
potential future of PACE programs while providing suggestions
about possible means of improving them and ensuring their
success.
I. SPREAD

OF

ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS GENERALLY

Energy efficiency and conservation measures have garnered
increased attention from both private and public actors in recent
years.1 Incentives have become especially prevalent with respect
to solar energy. More specifically, more and more financial institutions are using incentives to pave the way for the installation of
solar photovoltaic systems.2 In the years to come, it is likely that
alternative financing methods for the installation of solar energy
capacity will only continue to multiply.3 States and the federal
government have offered financial incentives for the purchase
and installation of renewable energy systems for decades, but
these incentives have remained relatively unpopular due to a
variety of factors, including an overwhelming number of choices,
a significant amount of required paperwork, and the cost of a
typical system, which is usually around $10,000 or more.4 In
order to be effective, state and federal incentive programs must
accomplish two key priorities: they must streamline the purchase
experience and they must cut upfront costs to the extent that
consumers will not be deterred by them.5
As of 2011, nineteen states offered some kind of tax incentive to reduce consumers’ cost of purchasing and installing technology that enables greater energy efficiency.6 At the local and
state levels of government, property tax incentives are the most
1. John C. Dernbach, Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. & Darin Lowder, Energy
Efficiency and Conservation: New Legal Tools and Opportunities, 25 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV’T 7, 7 (2011) (“Energy efficiency and conservation measures are lowhanging fruit in the U.S. effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and wean
ourselves from imported fossil energy.”).
2. Jason R. Wiener & Christian Alexander, On-Site Renewable Energy and
Public Finance: How and Why Municipal Bond Financing is the Key to Propagating
Access to On-Site Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 559, 565 (2010) (“More and more financial institutions are
providing funding sources for solar PV systems in response to consumers’
increasing interest in the installation of such systems.”).
3. Id. at 566.
4. Joel B. Eisen, Can Urban Solar Become a “Disruptive” Technology?: The Case
for Solar Utilities, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 53, 77–78 (2010).
5. Id. at 76–77.
6. Roberta F. Mann, Federal, State, and Local Tax Policies for Climate Change:
Coordination or Cross-Purpose?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 369, 383 (2011).
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commonly available form of renewable energy incentive.7 For
instance, with respect to residential property, homeowners may
receive tax credits for building new homes that meet certain
energy standards, improving the energy efficiency of their
homes, or installing the capacity to generate renewable energy.8
In particular, many states and the federal government offer
incentives for the residential installation of solar capacity.9 Property tax abatements, unlike credits or exemptions, are wholly
ineffective unless the energy improvement in question causes an
increase in the value of the property, consequently excluding the
property owner from an otherwise required increase in property
tax.10
Ultimately, high upfront costs to consumers remain perhaps
the largest barrier to the purchase and installation of improved
energy efficiency and renewable energy capacity.11 Municipal
financing is one method of reining in the high upfront costs of
residential energy improvements.12 In order to rein in upfront
costs of such improvements, municipalities may create special
assessment districts (SADs):
A SAD is a political subdivision created to construct a
proposed improvement, with no powers or liabilities
except for those expressly or implicitly conferred by state
statute. SADs are designated geographical or political
areas in which special levies are assessed upon properties
in order to finance local improvements that directly benefit those properties that have been assessed.13
SADs are by no means a recent development. In fact, they
have been used to finance local improvements since colonial times.14
7. Id. at 384 (“Property tax incentives are exemptions, exclusions, abatements, and credits that exclude the added value of the upgrade or renewable
energy system from the valuation of the property for taxation purposes.”).
8. Id. at 380.
9. Id. at 387.
10. Id. at 385–86.
11. Ethan Elkind, Fannie and Freddie Stop the PACE of Clean Energy, LEGAL
PLANET: THE ENVTL. LAW & POLICY BLOG (June 18, 2010), http://legalplanet.
wordpress.com/2010/06/18/fannie-and-freddie-stop-the-pace-of-clean-energy/
(“One of the biggest barriers to getting homeowners to retrofit their homes to
make them more energy efficient and install renewables like solar panels is the
high upfront costs.”).
12. Wiener & Alexander, supra note 2, at 569.
13. Id. at 569–70.
14. Id. at 571; Justin Gillis, Tax Plan to Turn Old Buildings ‘Green’ Finds
Favor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011, at B1 (“For decades, cities and counties have
created special taxing districts to finance improvements that benefit private
property, such as street lights or sewers. Bonds are issued to pay for the
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PACE PROGRAMS

PACE programs, on the other hand, are relatively new, and
have been described as particularly dynamic and controversial.15
PACE programs use a particular type of SAD known as an energy
financing district (EFD).16 Through EFDs, municipal governments can offer property owners lower-than-market interest rates
on loans toward energy improvements, which are in turn paid
back through property tax.17 While EFDs are useful for a number of reasons, perhaps their most beneficial features are longer
repayment periods and lower interest rates as compared to conventional loans.18 A municipality must fulfill several legal
requirements in order to set up and implement an EFD. As an
initial matter, local governments must obtain permission, typically from the state legislature in the form of an enabling statute,
to make special assessments.19 As is the case with SADs generally,
local governments must often turn to bonds as a means of
obtaining the capital necessary to back PACE liens.20
Within the EFD framework used by PACE programs, the cost
of energy efficiency and renewable energy improvements is
added to property owners’ yearly property tax, obliging them to
pay back the cost by way of a lien on the property.21 Thus, the
obligation to pay for the improvements runs with the property,
not the property owner.22 As a result, PACE programs include
projects, then repaid with surcharges on tax bills. If an owner sells, the
surcharge stays with the property.”).
15. Ian M. Larson, Note, Keeping PACE: Federal Mortgage Lenders Halt Local
Clean Energy Programs, 76 MO. L. REV. 599, 599 (2011).
16. Wiener & Alexander, supra note 2, at 574.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 575–76 (For instance, “[i]n California, the City of Berkeley used
its existing power under the Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act of 1982,
which established authority for charter cities to form custom SADs, to create its
FIRST program, which finances residential solar installations. Subsequently,
statewide legislation has made this power available to all California cities and
counties.”); Larson, supra note 15, at 604; Jonathan B. Wilson, Maura A.
Marcheski & Elias B. Hinckley, The Great PACE Controversy: Renewable Energy
Financing Program Hits a Snag, 25 PROB. & PROP. 38, 39 (2011) (“To implement a
PACE program, local governments must have statutory authority to both issue
bonds and use the bond proceeds to finance renewable energy projects. Typically, local governments create statutorily authorized special assessment districts, similar to those used for other public projects.”).
20. Larson, supra note 15, at 601.
21. Id. at 600.
22. Id. at 602. For example, beginning on March 1, 2010, in San Francisco, PACE program participants were eligible for loans of up to $50,000 for
energy improvements. The loans were to be attached to the property, rather
than the owner, and paid back over no more than twenty years. Gerry Shih, San
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sufficient front-end funding to help property owners avoid
upfront costs and defray their financial concerns about measures
that might otherwise be prohibitively expensive.23 In addition,
the fact that the relevant property tax assessment runs with the
property means that PACE programs effectively address property
owners’ concerns about recovering costs from energy improvements if they sell their property.24 In the event of foreclosure or
failure to pay property taxes, a PACE lien takes priority over the
property owner’s mortgage, and payments that are due must first
be made to the municipality rather than the mortgage lending
company.25 While controversial, first lien priority upon foreclosure or default is crucial for the success of municipal special
assessments such as those used in PACE programs because it provides an irreplaceable incentive for investors, who can be relatively certain that their investments are secure.26

Francisco Joins the Club of Green Financiers, N.Y. TIMES BAY AREA BLOG (Feb. 8,
2010, 8:12 PM), http://bayarea.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/08/san-franciscojoins-the-club-of-green-financiers/.
23. Wilson et al., supra note 19, at 38–39; Erin Elizabeth Burg Hupp,
Refining Green Building Regulations and Funding Green Buildings in Order to Achieve
Greenhouse Gas Reductions, 42 URB. LAW. 639, 645–46 (2010) (“Importantly,
PACE bonds include front-end funding for the installation of energy-saving
devices, provide municipalities flexibility in implementing such funding, and
allow owners to contract directly with contractors. PACE bonds, therefore, are
one avenue for local governments in the financial battle against the high
upfront cost of certain green building retrofits.”).
24. Wilson et al., supra note 19, at 39 (“Because PACE financing runs with
the property, the buyer acquires not only the benefit of the energy improvements but the remaining payment obligation as well. In this way, PACE financing is intended to encourage renewable energy and energy efficiency
investments even when the current owner may not retain ownership long
enough to completely recoup the investment.”).
25. Larson, supra note 15, at 602. “According to PACE supporters, the
government’s inherent power to assess taxes not only gave municipalities the
capacity to establish PACE boards but also gave board-approved bonds seniority
over any outstanding land-secured debts. The seniority of municipal assessments effectively means that the lender’s private mortgage loans are instantly
subordinated to the municipality.” Id. at 605.
26. Id. at 606 (“Municipal bonds backed by property taxes traditionally
have experienced low default rates, and the assurance of being repaid first even
when default occurs provides a prime incentive for investors.”). “‘[T]here is
currently almost no demand in the secondary market for conventional junior
mortgage instruments.’” Id. “Because first lien status is critical to the success of
PACE programs, eliminating the priority lien status would make PACE programs effectively impossible to finance through the capital markets.” Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 815 F. Supp. 2d 630, 633
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\27-1\NDE111.txt

278

unknown

Seq: 6

19-APR-13

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

III.

13:32

[Vol. 27

A BRIEF HISTORY OF PACE PROGRAMS: ORIGINS
AND PROLIFERATION

Given the relative historical success of the state with respect
to energy efficiency and renewable energy, perhaps it is not surprising that PACE programs were first developed and implemented in California.27 The state paved the way for the
innovative PACE approach to energy improvement financing
with the implementation of its 2008 Assembly Bill 811 (AB 811),
which enabled all California cities and counties to create SADs.28
AB 811 authorized cities and counties to provide special property
tax assessments to owners of already-developed residential, commercial and industrial property for the installation or purchase
of renewable energy capacity.29 The City of Berkeley established
the first PACE program, known as the Financing Initiative for
Renewable and Solar Technology (FIRST) program, in November 2008.30 The program was an immediate success, and other
California cities soon began to implement their own PACE programs.31 Eventually, PACE financing went statewide in California.32 As PACE programs became more popular nationally,
many states, including Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin,
passed legislation to implement programs similar to those in Cal27. On Its Own Sunny Path, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21534802 (discussing California’s progressive legislation
related to greenhouse gas emissions and renewable energy).
28. Hupp, supra note 23, at 646. “AB 811 requires that the city: (i) designate the boundary of the area where these loans are available; (ii) draft a specific contract specifying the terms and conditions of the loan; (iii) create a
method for prioritizing property owners’ requests; and (iv) create a plan for
raising capital through bond funds.” Id.
29. Id. “AB 811 requires that the property be already developed in order
to ensure that the funds are used for the retrofitting of existing buildings rather
than the construction of new buildings.” Id.
30. Larson, supra note 15, at 602; PACE Program Financing, ONE BLOCK
OFF THE GRID, http://solarfinancing.1bog.org/pace-program-solar-financing/
(last visited Jan. 7, 2013); Wiener & Alexander, supra note 2, at 577 (“Berkeley’s
FIRST program was launched in November 2008. In November 2007, Berkeley’s city council approved of the concept for a Sustainable Energy Financing
District (‘SEFD’). The city amended the Berkeley Municipal Code to create the
Special Tax Financing Law (‘STFL’) under its charter authority. The STFL,
which incorporated by reference provisions of the Mello-Roos Act, authorized
the creation of a SEFD.”).
31. Larson, supra note 15, at 602–04; Wiener & Alexander, supra note 2,
at 577.
32. Larson, supra note 15, at 603.
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ifornia.33 By the spring of 2011, at least twenty-three states and
the District of Columbia had passed legislation specifically providing for PACE programs.34 Although the many PACE programs that rapidly appeared throughout the country were
fundamentally similar, there were some variations, even among
the very first programs that were established.35
IV.

ADVANTAGES

OF

PACE PROGRAMS

There are a number of very good reasons that PACE programs spread throughout the country so rapidly. They provide
many intriguing advantages for property owners, investors, local
governments, and the nation as a whole. Broadly speaking, the
SAD features of PACE programs are beneficial in ways that distinguish them from equity-based financing options.36 First of all,
PACE programs make financial assistance for energy improvements available to property owners who might not otherwise
qualify for equity or debt financing.37 Although most PACE programs have minimal requirements that must be met by participants, they typically do not require participants to have a
particular credit rating.38 In addition, the superiority of EFD
liens over any mortgage obligations on the property provides
local governments and investors with increased security and
enhances their expectations of payment in the event of default.39
Furthermore, PACE programs have beneficial tax consequences
for property owners, local governments, and investors.40 Finally,
33. Wilson et al., supra note 19, at 39.
34. Dernbach et al., supra note 1, at 11. In fact, PACE programs were
established all across the continental United States. Shih, supra note 22 (“Since
Berkeley and Palm Desert in Southern California kick-started their pilot programs in consecutive weeks two years ago, the concept has quickly gained traction from coast to coast, with cities and counties in 12 states, including Sonoma
County; Boulder, Colo.; and Montgomery County, Md., in the suburbs of Washington, D.C., rolling out similar concepts.”); Gillis, supra note 14, at B4 (“The
idea took off, and 25 states and the District of Columbia soon passed PACE
legislation. One of the most successful programs to date has been in Sonoma
County, Calif., where retrofit projects exceeding $50 million have been
financed.”).
35. See Wiener & Alexander, supra note 2, at 577–80, for a survey of early
PACE programs in cities and counties including Berkeley, Palm Desert, and
Sonoma County, California; Boulder, Colorado; and Babylon, New York.
36. Wiener & Alexander, supra note 2, at 581.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 582 (“The tax-free status of municipal and county bonds allows
these governments to obtain lower interest rates in many cases, which they can
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the EFDs used in PACE programs are a means of financing that is
relatively familiar to local governments.41
Most significantly, PACE programs allow property owners to
make energy-related improvements to their property without
being deterred by daunting upfront costs.42 In fact, the
increased property tax assessments required to repay PACE liens
are offset by PACE participants’ reduced energy costs.43 Perhaps
the second most important feature of PACE programs is that they
address property owners’ concerns about recovering costs in the
event that they decide to sell their property.44 As mentioned previously, the EFD assessment obligations of the programs run with
the property rather than the property owner, so program participants will only have to worry about the tax consequences of special assessments as long as they continue to own the property in
question.45 Essentially, PACE financing is more attractive to
property owners than tax credits or rebates because it caters to
their tendency to downplay obligations that span far into the
future.46
PACE programs are also highly beneficial on a much larger
scale. On a communal level, PACE programs can create jobs and
promote sustainability while only placing financial burdens on
potentially pass on to participating property owners. In addition, the interest
portion of the repayments is tax-deductible, similar to mortgages.”).
41. Id. at 575 (“Since SADs are already commonly used to finance a number of local improvements, municipal and county officials are more likely to be
familiar with operating them.”).
42. Wilson et al., supra note 19, at 38–39; Eisen, supra note 4, at 85
(“Property tax financing seems to eliminate the solar system’s upfront cost, as a
homeowner pays nothing up front and the city or county offers 100 percent
financing.”).
43. Wilson et al., supra note 19, at 39. In fact, “[e]xperts point out that,
with modern techniques and equipment, a retrofit can typically cut a building’s
energy use so much that the project pays for itself in as little as five years. The
most famous recent example was the refurbishment of the Empire State Building, which cut energy use by nearly 40 percent, turning it into one of New
York’s greenest buildings.” Gillis, supra note 14, at B4.
44. Wilson et al., supra note 19, at 39.
45. Wiener & Alexander, supra note 2, at 581; Eisen, supra note 4, at 85
(“Because the debt is repaid through the property tax, if the homeowner moves
before the system’s payoff period, the debt simply continues to be repaid by the
next owner. The obligation is meant to attach to the land, not the borrower,
and to run with the land until paid off.”).
46. Eisen, supra note 4, at 85 (“The PACE obligation is comparable to
taking on a second mortgage, and because Americans move so often, homeowners might discount an obligation that spans decades into the future. This is
what PACE proponents effectively hope for when they assert the obligation will
run to subsequent homeowners.”).
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those taxpayers that choose to participate in them.47 Moreover,
the renewable energy and energy efficiency improvements
brought about by PACE programs typically benefit not only program participants, but entire communities, by increasing property values.48 PACE programs are also beneficial on a national
level because they help compensate for gaps and shortcomings in
federal energy policy. As a result of their local funding, they promote energy improvements and sustainability at a minimal cost
to the federal government and do not necessitate federal regulation or an increase in federal energy taxes.49
V.

DISADVANTAGES

OF

PACE PROGRAMS

Unfortunately, the PACE approach to financing energy
improvements is not entirely free of disadvantages. While they
provide a number of financial incentives and benefits, PACE programs are unavailable to many people, perhaps especially those
in lower-income communities, because only property owners, not
renters, may participate in them.50 In addition, the administrative costs related to determining property owners’ suitability for
participation can often make them prohibitively expensive for
local governments to implement and manage.51 Similarly, local
government debt constraints can deter communities from implementing PACE programs.52 From the perspective of consumers,
47. Wilson et al., supra note 19, at 39.
48. Id. at 39; Wiener & Alexander, supra note 2, at 583 (“PACE programs
offer a relatively low risk source of financing that has tangible benefits for property value, the environment, and energy distribution. . . . Similarly, PACE
financing may arguably enhance the tax base of a community through higher
property values.”).
49. Wilson et al., supra note 19, at 39.
50. Wiener & Alexander, supra note 2, at 582. Nevertheless, “[c]ities and
counties may be able to address this potentially serious limitation by tailoring
their programs specifically to landlords.” Id.
51. Id.; Eisen, supra note 4, at 87 (“PACE is far too complex for the average locality to administer. . . . A city would be required to make decisions on an
ongoing basis about individual homeowners’ suitability for participation in the
program. This is a responsibility that not all cities will be willing to undertake,
and it is therefore no surprise that cities like Berkeley with active environmental
departments have been the first ones to adopt PACE.”).
52. Wilson et al., supra note 19, at 39 (“Virginia was one of the many
states to authorize PACE. But Arlington County, perhaps the most progressive
community in the state, is on record as having no plans to create a local program because of debt concerns. . . . Increasing a community’s total debt obligation, which a PACE bond issuance would do, can result in a lower credit rating
for the community, which in turn increases capital costs for all community programs.”); Eisen, supra note 4, at 87 (“Many localities are fighting for their economic lives, and schools, libraries and other public facilities will be much
higher priorities than PACE.”).
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though the programs certainly reduce otherwise daunting
upfront costs, they do not fully encompass and streamline the
transaction costs of energy improvements.53 Furthermore, some
property owners may be reluctant to participate in PACE programs if they are required to disclose their higher property tax
obligations in the event that they choose to sell their property.54
After all, while PACE programs spread rapidly and were authorized in more than 22 states, only a few thousand people took
advantage of them, although this may be due simply to the limited amount of time they were authorized prior to the rise of the
controversy that currently surrounds them.55 Perhaps most
importantly, PACE programs have created a number of controversial issues with respect to the relative priority of PACE liens
and mortgage obligations in the event of foreclosure.56
Although one of the advantages of PACE programs is their minimal underwriting requirements, the fact that they offer loans typically not available from private lenders puts additional strain on
an already tense relationship between local governments, property owners, and mortgage lenders.57 Finally, yet another potential disadvantage of PACE financing is the possibility that the
technology used for energy improvements will become obsolete
and lose significant value during the life of a PACE lien.58
Some argue that the most critical issue with PACE programs
is that they fail to account for the practical realities of the real
estate market.59 A prominent example of this issue is that in
many instances PACE programs fail to anticipate that, while
property encumbered with a PACE lien may be sold at any time
without any lingering PACE obligations for the prior owner, a
53. Eisen, supra note 4, at 88 (“Cities with programs in place have no
municipal installers. So while the city provides the funding to the homeowner,
she is still required to handle legal and technical responsibilities.”).
54. Id. at 86.
55. Todd Woody, Energy Savers, Loan Losers: Efficiency Program is Jeopardized
by Policy on Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2010, at B1.
56. Hupp, supra note 23, at 647.
57. Prentiss Cox, Keeping PACE?: The Case Against Property Assessed Clean
Energy Financing Programs, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 83, 113 (2011).
58. Id. at 115 (“Alternative energy investments, in particular, occur in an
environment of rapid technological change that means costs of a solar PV system may be in long-term decline. A solar PV system that costs $12,000 today
may, in ten years or less, cost $3,000, be a quarter of the size, and produce three
times the electricity. Today’s economically beneficial investment may look like
a MS-DOS computer on the roof in 2019.”).
59. Id. at 85–86. “When properly characterized and understood as a
home financing technique, PACE loses much of its appeal as a means of resolving long-standing homeowner concerns about investments in residential energy
improvements.” Id. at 86–87.
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mortgage that is encumbered with a PACE lien may be very difficult to sell on the secondary mortgage market.60 Moreover, real
estate transactions do not take place in a vacuum, and potential
buyers are likely to consider all encumbrances on real property,
including PACE liens, when negotiating purchases.61 As a result,
some argue that the perceived benefits of PACE financing are
often negated upon resale of property.62 Essentially, PACE
financing offers the same advantages and disadvantages as any
transferable, fixed-rate financing mechanism.63 An emphasis on
the public benefits of PACE financing does not change its fundamental essence from the perspective of property owners or lenders, who simply view it as another lien on the property when
anticipating possible circumstances in the case of default.64
VI.

CHALLENGES

BY THE

FHFA, FANNIE MAE,

AND

FREDDIE MAC

Meanwhile, it is the issues regarding mortgage and lien priority that are at the heart of the recent controversy surrounding
PACE programs. As mentioned previously, PACE liens take priority over mortgages in the event of foreclosure, which makes
them more appealing to both local governments and investors
and is crucial to their success.65 However, this feature of PACE
liens also raises grave concerns for mortgage underwriters
because it makes PACE-encumbered mortgages much more difficult to sell even before foreclosure.66 More specifically, Fannie
60. Id. at 86 (“The failure of existing PACE programs to adequately anticipate the adverse secondary mortgage market reaction is a prominent example
of this problem.”).
61. Id. at 96–97 (“A property tax special assessment that is the subject of
negotiation between the seller (the ‘PACE homeowner’ who obtained the
financing) and the home buyer has two foreseeable outcomes: (1) the PACE
homeowner pays off the remaining balance of the PACE financing at the time
of sale, or (2) the buyer assumes responsibility for future special assessments.”).
62. Id. at 96 (“The arguments for homeowner advantages with PACE are
predicated on the idea that tying repayment to property tax assessments radically changes the characteristics of financing for homeowners. Unfortunately,
the dynamics and constraints of the real estate finance market shape the realities of PACE financing. As a result, the claimed benefits for PACE programs
disappear upon closer examination.”).
63. Id. at 101.
64. Id. at 106. “As with the sale of the property by a PACE homeowner,
the impact on lenders does not disappear simply because the PACE obligation
exists in the form of a liability for future tax payments rather than a current lien
on the property.” Id. at 107.
65. See supra notes 25 and 26.
66. Wilson et al., supra note 19, at 39 (“Standard government tax assessments—ones that are used to fund public projects—typically have senior lien
priority over mortgages. Mortgage underwriters feared that the loans secured
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Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHFA have voiced numerous concerns about the impact of innovative PACE financing on taxpayers.67 The depth of the controversy over PACE programs became
fully apparent when, with the supervision of the FHFA, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac flatly refused to purchase any mortgages
burdened by a PACE lien.68
Essentially, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac elected to block
PACE programs, rendering their present effects uncertain and
placing their future in jeopardy.69 On May 5, 2010, Freddie Mac
issued an industry-wide memorandum instructing all of its lenders that PACE liens were not to be considered senior to any mortgages.70 On July 6, 2010, the FHFA issued a statement echoing
the concerns of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with respect to
PACE liens.71 It also directed the two agencies, as well as the
Federal Home Loan Banks, to take three actions regarding their
local PACE programs: to waive prohibitions against senior municipal liens in existing PACE-encumbered mortgages; to take specific steps to protect themselves in PACE jurisdictions; and to
ensure that any pledged collateral was free of PACE liens.72 On
the same day, the United States Comptroller of the Currency
issued a memorandum cautioning national banks and lenders
about the possible impact of PACE programs.73 Then, on July
14, 2010, the FHFA issued another statement expressing support
for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s actions against PACE programs, citing its obligation to police mortgage proceedings for
by mortgages would become subordinate to PACE liens and as a result would
not be readily sellable on the secondary mortgage market.”).
67. Woody, supra note 55, at B2 (“Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government entities that guarantee more than half of the residential mortgages in
the United States, have different priorities. They are worried that taxpayers will
end up as losers if a homeowner defaults on a mortgage on a home that uses
such creative financing. Typically, property taxes must be paid first from any
proceeds on a foreclosed home.”).
68. Larson, supra note 15, at 600.
69. Todd Woody, Loan Giants Opt to Block Energy Programs, N.Y. TIMES, July
4, 2010, at 12; Woody, supra note 55, at B2 (“The uncertainty has had ripple
effects beyond homeowners. For example, after San Francisco suspended its
program, Recurve, a local retrofitting company, was forced to temporarily lay
off workers.”).
70. Larson, supra note 15, at 610; Woody, supra note 55, at B2.
71. Larson, supra note 15, at 610; Regulators Warn on Energy Retrofit Loan
Programs, 29 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 34, 34–35 (2010) [hereinafter
Regulators].
72. Larson, supra note 15, at 610–11.
73. Id. at 611–12; Regulators, supra note 71, at 34–35.
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safety and soundness.74 Among its many criticisms of PACE liens,
the FHFA has argued that they are fundamentally different from
other special assessments that are commonly accepted and routinely used by local governments.75
The restrictions imposed by the FHFA, Fannie Mae, and
Freddie Mac have had a devastating impact on PACE programs,
particularly in California, where the programs first developed
and became popular.76 In fact, the restrictions have not only
negatively impacted properties with PACE liens, but all residential properties in jurisdictions with PACE programs.77 Many cities
and local governments were outraged.78 Advocacy group PACENow argued that the restrictions effectively halted any active or
potential programs throughout the country.79 On July 29, 2010,
the Sierra Club filed the first of many legal complaints against
the FHFA seeking declaratory and equitable relief and asking for
an injunction to prevent further interference with PACE financ74. “In keeping with our safety and soundness obligations, the Federal
Housing Finance Agency will defend vigorously its actions that aim to protect
taxpayers, lenders, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Homeowners should not be
placed at risk by programs that alter lien priorities and fail to operate with
sound underwriting guidelines and consumer protections. Mortgage holders
should not be forced to absorb new credit risks after they have already purchased or guaranteed a mortgage.” Statement on PACE Programs, Edward J.
DeMarco, Acting Director, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency (July 14, 2010) (on file).
75. According to the agency, they “‘present significant risk to lenders and
secondary market entities, may alter valuations for mortgage-backed securities
and are not essential for successful programs to spur energy conservation.’”
Todd Woody, A Blow to Home Retrofits, N.Y. TIMES GREEN BLOG (July 6, 2010, 4:21
PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/06/a-blow-to-home-energyretrofits/.
76. Woody, supra note 55, at B2. “[I]t is not a stretch to assume that lenders in the home financing market are guided in their decisions by Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac requirements. They are likely to give important consideration
to [Government Sponsored Enterprise] lending guidelines, and will be less
likely to offer mortgages that do not conform thereto.” Town of Babylon v.
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 790 F. Supp. 2d 47, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
77. Cox, supra note 57, at 104 (“Because the FHFA statement linked its
underwriting restrictions to all mortgages in a jurisdiction with PACE rather
than just properties with a PACE loan, the existence of a PACE program would
impact all residential home finance in a given community.”).
78. Woody, supra note 69, at 12.
79. Larson, supra note 15, at 612. “Stated concisely, PACENow made
three key responses: (1) in ignoring state assessment rights, FHFA mischaracterized PACE programs as granting loans; (2) because only the portions of PACE
liens in arrears are accelerated into senior positions, PACE lien seniority does
not significantly harm creditors; and (3) collateral-based programs, the type of
borrowing PACE relies upon, do not pose significantly higher risks than abilityto-pay lending.” Id. at 612–13.
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ing.80 Critics of the FHFA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac have
argued that their concerns are out of proportion and undermine
the basic authority of local governments to use assessments for
public improvements.81
In addition to localities and advocacy groups, many significant federal government actors have reacted strongly in support
of PACE financing. The White House in particular has been very
supportive of PACE since its inception. In fact, PACE supporters
have relied heavily on a set of White House policy guidelines
issued in a report by Vice President Joe Biden in 2009 when arguing for PACE’s inherent safety to lenders.82 Shortly after the
release of Vice President Biden’s report, the White House allocated $80 billion of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) funds in support of local government PACE programs.83
The Obama Administration provided strong financial backing
for PACE programs,84 and, along with other federal, state, and
local government entities, has continued to voice public support
for them in the midst of the current controversy.85 On May 7,
2010, merely two days after Freddie Mac issued its initial industrywide memorandum to lenders, effectively undermining the
seniority of PACE liens, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued
a set of best practice guidelines, including much more rigorous
underwriting standards, designed to help implement the policy
framework announced by Vice President Biden in 2009 and
ensure prudent financing practices with respect to PACE pro-

80. Id. at 614.
81. Elkind, supra note 11.
82. “The White House Policy Framework included three guidelines
intended to protect individual homeowners and eight guidelines intended to
protect lenders; it is these guidelines that supporters would come to rely on as
proof of PACE’s inherent safety to lenders.” Larson, supra note 15, at 607–08
(citing POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR PACE FINANCING PROGRAMS (Oct. 18, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/PACE_Principles.pdf.).
83. Larson, supra note 15, at 607; Dernbach et al., supra note 1, at 11
(stating that ARRA programs encouraged the development of PACE
programs).
84. Woody, supra note 55, at B1 (stating that the Obama Administration
devoted $150 million in stimulus money to PACE programs).
85. Wilson et al., supra note 19, at 40 (“Despite the position of FHFA and
OCC, other federal agencies and the White House continued publicly to support PACE programs as a tool for job creation and clean energy growth. In
response to the recent FHFA statement, additional state and federal officials
have come forward to support continuing PACE programs. California, a state
with strong PACE support, has taken specific action against the FHFA’s
statement.”).
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grams.86 Congress also reacted quickly to the mortgage industry’s blockade of PACE programs, introducing promising yet
ultimately unsuccessful legislation called the PACE Assessment
Protection Act of 201087 as part of an effort to compel the mortgage lending agencies to facilitate PACE programs.88 In the fall
of 2010, further attempts at reaching a legislative compromise
between the priorities of PACE supporters and the real estate
finance industry were derailed when Republicans assumed control of the House of Representatives after the November 2010
elections.89 In the summer of 2011, Congress produced yet
another unsuccessful legislative attempt to resolve the PACE controversy, known as the PACE Assessment Protection Act of 2011,
which would have required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to
respect all PACE assessments in compliance with the aforementioned DOE guidelines, including much more rigorous underwriting standards, but never made it out of committee.90
VII.

KEY FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS

Amid unsuccessful legislative efforts, pressure to resolve the
PACE controversy has mounted against the federal govern86. These DOE guidelines, issued two days after Freddie Mac’s May 5,
2010 statement and prior to the FHFA’s statements condemning PACE programs, set forth recommended best practices for PACE programs and assessments. These best practices are meant to provide additional protection to both
PACE program participants and mortgage lenders. See generally DEP’T OF
ENERGY, GUIDELINES FOR PILOT PACE FINANCING PROGRAMS (May 7, 2010),
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wip/pdfs/arra_guidelines_for_pilot_pace_programs.pdf.
87. H.R. 5766, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 3642, 111th Cong. (2010).
88. Larson, supra note 15, at 613. “According to the resolution, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac would be barred from making special requirements for
properties affected by PACE liens.” Id. “Congressman Mike Thompson (DCal.) introduced the bill, H.R. 5766, with 29 cosponsors in the House of Representatives. Identical companion legislation [S. 3642] was introduced in the
Senate by Barbara Boxer (D-Cal.), Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), Kirsten Gillibrand (DN.Y.), and Mark Begich (D-Alaska).” Wilson et al., supra note 19, at 41.
89. Wilson et al., supra note 19, at 42. Efforts to arrive at a compromise
were led by Representative Steve Israel (D-N.Y.) and Representative Mike
Thompson (D-Cal.). Id.; Woody, supra note 75 (“Representative Steve Israel,
Democrat of New York, said the Department of Energy was willing to insure the
Federal Housing Finance Agency against any PACE-related mortgage losses[,
but the FHFA rejected the Department’s offer].”).
90. H.R. 2599, 112th Cong. (2011); “A bill introduced in Congress known
as ‘The PACE Assessment Protection Act’ would resolve the conflict between
PACE programs by requiring that the underwriting standards used by [Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac] acquiesce in all respects to PACE program assessments
that comply with the guidelines issued by the Department of Energy (DOE).”
Cox, supra note 57, at 107.
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ment,91 and a number of lawsuits have been filed against the
FHFA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac.92 In very general terms,
these lawsuits contend that PACE liens should not be treated differently than any other property tax assessments that are normally given priority over preexisting mortgage liens.93 More
specifically, they allege that the FHFA has violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by effectively conducting rulemaking without fulfilling notice and comment requirements.94
Furthermore, they allege violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).95 They often seek declaratory relief in the
form of an official ruling that PACE liens are assessments rather
than loans.96 Perhaps most significantly, however, they typically
seek an injunction against the underwriting restrictions imposed
on PACE liens by the FHFA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac.97 A
few key decisions are indicative of the disagreement among federal courts with respect to the legal status of PACE programs and
the restrictions imposed against them.
A. Town of Babylon v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 790 F. Supp.
2d 47 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
The first of these decisions involved claims initially filed in
the Eastern District of New York against the FHFA, Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) by the Town of Babylon, New York in an effort to protect
its PACE program, known as the Long Island Green Homes Program.98 The town alleged, among other grievances, that the
defendants had promulgated rules in violation of the APA and
violated NEPA by failing to conduct a required environmental
impact analysis with respect to those rules.99 In granting the
91. Woody, supra note 75 (stating that efforts to pass legislation permitting PACE programs to go forward without FHFA restrictions will likely
intensify).
92. See Wilson et al., supra note 19, at 41–42 (discussing lawsuits filed by
California Attorney General Jerry Brown and Sonoma County, as well as the
reactions of Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and other public officials).
93. Cox, supra note 57, at 85.
94. Id. at 104.
95. See, e.g., Town of Babylon v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 790 F. Supp. 2d
47, 48–49 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
96. Cox, supra note 57, at 105.
97. Id. at 104–105.
98. Town of Babylon, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 51. According to the Town of
Babylon, “the typical cost of a PACE improvement is less [than] $9,000, and . . .
reduced energy costs typically exceed the homeowners’ monthly repayment
obligations, which average less than $92. Babylon further asserts that there has
never been a single default on a PACE financed repayment obligation.” Id.
99. Id. at 48–49.
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defendants’ motions to dismiss, the court first noted the FHFA’s
role as conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, commonly
known as the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), which
it assumed in September 2008 in accord with the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA).100 As conservator, the
FHFA is granted broad authority to “‘take any action authorized
by [the federal banking statute], which [it] determines is in the
best interests of the [GSE’s] or the FHFA.’”101 The court reasoned that the FHFA’s actions with respect to PACE programs
were clearly undertaken within the scope of its role as conservator, and were thus beyond the court’s jurisdiction.102 With
respect to the OCC’s motion to dismiss, the court held that the
town could not satisfy the element of redressability that is
required to establish standing for its claim.103 Essentially, the
court arrived at the somewhat precarious conclusion that, even if
it “were to grant the requested relief with respect to OCC, such
action would not require banks to authorize mortgages subject to
first lien priority PACE programs.”104 Thus, the court dismissed
the town’s claims with respect to the FHFA, Fannie Mae, Freddie
100. Id. at 50.
101. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(J)(ii)).
102. Id. at 54 (“FHFA’s argument that HERA divests this court of jurisdiction is dispositive. . . . HERA clearly and specifically limits the power of courts to
review the actions of the FHFA when acting as a conservator. Thus, 12 U.S.C.
§ 4617(f) provides that ‘no court may take any action to restrain or affect the
exercise of powers or functions of the Agency as a conservator or a receiver.’ ”)
(quoting 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f)).
103. The required elements to establish standing are injury in fact, a
causal connection between the injury alleged and the conduct complained of,
and a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at
55.
104. Id. This reasoning has been criticized by Ethan Elkind, among
others. In an entry of his blog, Elkind counters that
[t]he court’s decision places an excessive evidentiary burden on the
plaintiffs. PACE was humming along fine with national bank support
and was only stopped cold in its tracks by the single event of FHFA’s
new PACE policy. The banks clearly stopped lending because the federal government would no longer underwrite those loans. Why
assume there was any other reason, given the obvious timing of events?
And why also assume that somehow those same national banks may
have learned something new in the past year, when most of the programs were on hold, and now won’t be willing to lend to PACE
properties even if FHFA changes course?
Ethan Elkind, A Judicial Setback for PACE Energy Efficiency and Renewables Financing, LEGAL PLANET: THE ENVTL. LAW & POLICY BLOG (July 7, 2011), http://legal
planet.wordpress.com/2011/07/07/a-judicial-setback-for-pace-energy-efficiency-and-renewables-financing/.
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Mac, and the OCC. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court’s decision.105
B. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency,
815 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Another district court exhibited similar reasoning when the
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) brought suit against
the FHFA and the OCC in the Southern District of New York.106
The NRDC brought similar claims against the defendants, alleging violations of the APA and NEPA.107 Once again, the FHFA
and the OCC moved to dismiss the claims.108 Like the court in
Town of Babylon, this court justified its dismissal of the claims
against the FHFA by emphasizing the FHFA’s role as conservator
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.109 In addition, the court agreed
with the OCC’s argument that the NRDC could not satisfy the
redressability element of standing because redressability would
depend on the national banks’ willingness to resume their support for PACE programs.110 The NRDC sought to counter this
argument by referring to numerous municipal officials’ assurances that they would resume their activities with respect to
PACE programs if regulators’ actions were vacated.111 Nevertheless, the court maintained that these municipal officials, regardless of their own sentiments toward PACE programs, would be
unable to resume developing and implementing them without
the support of national banks.112 Furthermore, despite the fact
105. Town of Babylon v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 699 F.3d 221, 230 (2d
Cir. 2012) (“[E]ven if the OCC Bulletin were vacated, Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s refusal to purchase mortgages of properties subject to first-lien PACE
programs would remain in force. Any contention that national banks would
continue to lend on the same terms as before the issuance of the OCC Bulletin
must simply ignore the impact of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s changes in
policy. Therefore, we conclude that appellants have failed to show that it is
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that their claims against the OCC
would be redressed by vacatur of the Bulletin, and the claims against the OCC
were properly dismissed for lack of standing.”). The Natural Resources Defense
Council, appealing from a similar decision in Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, 815 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), was
also a party to this appeal.
106. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 2d at 630.
107. Id. at 632.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 634–35, 642 (“Because the FHFA was acting within its authority
under HERA when it issued the Letter, section 4617(f) applies and bars adjudication of this suit.”).
110. Id. at 637.
111. Id. at 639.
112. Id.
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that national banks supported PACE programs prior to the
actions of the FHFA and OCC, the NRDC was unable to provide
sufficient evidence to establish that banks would likely resume
their support of the programs if these actions were vacated.113
Consequently, the court ruled that the NRDC failed to demonstrate redressability of its alleged injuries, dismissing the NRDC’s
claims against the OCC, as well as the FHFA.114 On appeal, the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.115
C. People ex rel. Harris v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. C 1003084 CW, 2012 WL 3277229 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012),
vacated sub nom. Cnty. of Sonoma v. Fed.
Hous. Fin. Agency, No. C 1216986, 2013 WL 1130925 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 2013).
Meanwhile, plaintiffs challenging restrictions on PACE programs have been somewhat more successful, at least temporarily,
in the Northern District of California. California, Sonoma and
Placer Counties, the City of Palm Desert, and the Sierra Club
brought suit against the FHFA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac.116
While these plaintiffs brought claims117 similar to those brought
in New York, the California court reasoned very differently with
113. Id. For instance,
Rodney Dole, an official in Sonoma County, California, has declared
that in his “opinion” and “experience,” the national banks and other
lenders would once again grant mortgages on properties encumbered
by PACE liens if the Bulletin were vacated. This unsubstantiated assertion is insufficient to meet the NRDC’s burden. . . . Even if this Court
vacated the Bulletin, the national banks would still be subject to OCC
regulations and would still be required to consider safety and soundness in making their lending decisions. The national banks would still
be free to refuse to grant mortgages on properties encumbered by
PACE liens. Therefore, the NRDC has failed to sufficiently allege that
its requested relief is “likely” to redress its injuries.
Id. at 639–40.
114. Id. at 642. For criticism of this conclusion see Elkind, supra note
104.
115. See supra note 105.
116. People ex rel. Harris v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. C 10-03084 CW,
2011 WL 3794942, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2011). The court primarily
addressed the procedural issue of standing in this 2011 opinion, then proceeded to address the more substantive issues of the case in its 2012 opinion,
People ex rel. Harris v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, No. C 10-03084 CW, 2012
WL 3277229 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012), vacated sub nom. Cnty. of Sonoma v. Fed.
Hous. Fin. Agency, No. C 12-16986, 2013 WL 1130925 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 2013).
117. Id. at *1 (“Plaintiffs allege . . . that (1) Defendants disregarded statutorily imposed procedural requirements in adopting policies about the PACE
debt obligations, (2) Defendants’ determinations were substantively unlawful
because they were arbitrary and capricious, and (3) Defendants mischaracter-
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regard to the legal status of the claims. As in the New York cases,
the defendants argued that it was mere speculation that redressability could stem from a change in FHFA policy alone.118 However, unlike the federal district courts in New York, the Harris
court distinguished the current dispute from cases relied upon
by the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently
alleged that changes in FHFA policy, especially those informed
by the notice and comment process, would redress their grievances.119 As a result, the court held that the plaintiffs, with the
exception of the Sierra Club, successfully established standing for
their claims.120
As an initial matter, the court recognized that there is a
longstanding “presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative actions.”121 Unlike the New York courts, the California
court held that the FHFA was not immune from judicial review in
this instance, reasoning that substantive rulemaking is not within
the scope of the FHFA’s powers as conservator of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac.122 In addition to resembling substantive
rulemaking, the FHFA’s action with respect to PACE programs
was deemed to be subject to judicial review under the APA
ized the legal nature of the obligations, contrary to state law, deeming them
loans rather than traditional public assessments.”).
118. Id. at *3.
119. Id. at *5 (“The present actions differ because further action by a
federal agency would not be required to achieve Plaintiffs’ goals. Plaintiffs have
alleged that PACE encumbrances were treated like tax assessments until the
FHFA took the actions it did. Plaintiffs adequately allege that a change in the
FHFA’s policy would lead to a return [to] previous marketplace practices.”).
120. Id. at *7; Lawrence Hurley, Recent Court Ruling Favors White HouseBacked Home Energy Efficiency Program, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.
nytimes.com/gwire/2011/09/06/06greenwire-recent-court-ruling-favors-whitehouse-backed-31917.html (“One of the key elements of Wilken’s ruling was that
she concluded the plaintiffs had standing to sue, something the judges in New
York had not found, in part because there was no guarantee that banks would
recommence lending even if FHFA reversed its position.”).
121. Harris, 2011 WL 3794942, at *5 (citing Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d
1347, 1356 (9th Cir. 1988)).
122. Id. at *7–8. The court notes that the FHFA’s action “appears to fall
under the authority of section 4624(a), which provides that the FHFA Director
‘shall, by regulation, establish criteria governing the portfolio holdings of the
enterprises. . . [.]’ This would seem to support Plaintiffs’ argument that the
FHFA’s action amounted to substantive rule-making.” Id. at *8. In addition,
“[t]he FHFA’s policy does not refer to a specific homeowner seeking a mortgage, or to a group of PACE participants. It is a prospective, generally applicable directive. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to apply the adjudication
exemption from the APA’s notice and comment requirements to the actions of
which Plaintiffs complain.” Id. at *11.
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because it may be characterized as a final agency action.123 Furthermore, the court determined that the plaintiffs satisfied the
requirements for stating cognizable claims of NEPA violations.124
Thus, the court held that the plaintiffs, with the exception of the
Sierra Club, had standing with respect to their claims of APA violations and also satisfied the requirements necessary to pursue
claims for violations of the NEPA.125 Consequently, the court
granted Sonoma County’s motion for a preliminary injunction
requiring the FHFA to proceed with the notice and comment
process with regard to its restrictive policy on PACE-encumbered
mortgages,126 despite allowing the policy to remain in place for
the time being.127 Eventually, the plaintiffs jointly moved for
summary judgment on all of their claims.128 In a victory for
PACE proponents, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment with respect to their notice and comment
claim under the APA, denying the defendants’ cross-motion for
summary judgment.129 Accordingly, the court ordered that “the
FHFA shall complete the notice and comment process and publish a final rule to consummate that process.”130 On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order, holding
that the FHFA did in fact act within its powers as conservator and
123. Id. at *10 (“The July 2010 statement indicated the FHFA’s final
stance on PACE obligations, and the February 2011 letter reiterated that policy,
thus demonstrating a final agency action by the FHFA subject to review under
the APA.”); Hurley, supra note 120 (“Furthermore, by finding that FHFA is
required to seek notice and comment, Wilken agreed with one of the primary
claims made by the plaintiffs, which is that the 2010 statement was a final
agency action reviewable by a court under the Administrative Procedure Act.”).
124. Harris, 2011 WL 3794942, at *15.
125. Id. at *17.
126. In another entry of his blog, Ethan Elkind stated that “[u]nlike her
federal counterparts in the east, Judge Wilken acknowledged that FHFA’s decision ‘decimated’ residential PACE programs around the country” and that she
recognized the possible benefits that could be gleaned from the notice and
comment process. He also speculates that Judge Wilken’s favorable language
may indicate that she will “eventually order FHFA leaders to prepare a fullblown environmental impact statement (EIS) to analyze the impacts of their
policy.” Ethan Elkind, A Judicial Win for PACE Clean Energy Financing, LEGAL
PLANET: THE ENVTL. LAW & POLICY BLOG (Aug. 29, 2011), http://legalplanet.
wordpress.com/2011/08/29/a-judicial-win-for-pace-clean-energy-financing/.
127. Harris, 2011 WL 3794942, at *17–*18; Elkind, supra note 126; Hurley, supra note 120.
128. People ex rel. Harris v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. C 10-03084 CW,
2012 WL 3277229, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012), vacated sub nom. Cnty. of
Sonoma v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. C 12-16986, 2013 WL 1130925 (9th Cir.
Mar. 19, 2013).
129. Id. at *17.
130. Id.
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that its actions were not subject to judicial review or the rulemaking requirements of the APA.131
D. Leon Cnty., Fla. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 816 F. Supp. 2d
1205 (N.D. Fla. 2011).
Although it acknowledged the rulings that the California district court had already made in Harris in 2011, the court in yet
another recent case in the Northern District of Florida chose to
follow the reasoning of the New York district courts. The case
was brought by Leon County, Florida against the FHFA, Fannie
Mae, and Freddie Mac.132 Leon County had created the Leon
County Energy Improvement District to manage a PACE program known as the Leon County Energy Assistance Program
(LEAP), and sued the defendants seeking injunctive and declaratory relief for claims under the APA, among other claims.133 In
its discussion of the FHFA’s role as conservator, the court reasoned that the scope of the agency’s powers was sufficiently
broad to include “restricting an entity-in-conservatorship’s
purchase of PACE-encumbered mortgages.”134 Thus, the court
held that Leon County’s claims must be dismissed, essentially
opting to take the side of the New York district courts in the current PACE controversy.135 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision.136
VIII.

THE FUTURE

OF

PACE PROGRAMS: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

In the wake of these legal challenges by PACE supporters,
the FHFA proceeded with the rulemaking process in order to
codify its policies against PACE programs. At the time of the
court’s August 2012 decision in Harris, the FHFA had received
33,000 comments in response to its January 2012 Advance Notice
131. Cnty. of Sonoma v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. C 12-16986, 2013
WL 1130925, at *7 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 2013).
132. Leon Cnty., Fla. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 816 F. Supp. 2d 1205,
1205 (N.D. Fla. 2011).
133. Id. at 1206.
134. Id. at 1207.
135. Id. at 1209 (“There is a contrary decision . . . but the New York decisions have the better of it.”).
136. Leon Cnty., Fla. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 700 F.3d 1273, 1279
(11th Cir. 2012) (“For all of these reasons, we agree with the district court that,
under the specific facts in this case, the FHFA’s directive not to purchase PACEencumbered mortgages was within the FHFA’s broad powers as conservator.
Accordingly, because § 4617(f) provides that ‘no court may take any action to
restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the [FHFA] as a conservator or receiver,’ see 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b), the district court correctly held that
§ 4617(f) bars Leon County’s claims.”).
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of Proposed Rulemaking seeking comment on whether its restrictions on PACE programs should be maintained.137 On June 15,
2012, the FHFA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
Proposed Rule concerning underwriting standards for Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac with regard to PACE programs.138 Essentially, if finalized, the proposed rule would codify restrictions on
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to prevent them from purchasing
most mortgages encumbered by PACE liens, and from consenting to the imposition of a first lien PACE obligation on any
mortgage.139 As the Harris court noted, the FHFA was originally
required to issue a final rule within a reasonable time after the
end of the ninety-nine day comment period, which came to a
close on September 13, 2012.140 Given that the Ninth Circuit
recently vacated the Harris court’s order, it is no longer entirely
clear how the FHFA will proceed, but it is reasonable to presume
that the agency will issue a final rule rather than abandoning
rulemaking altogether at this late stage in the process.
A number of states have already reacted in various ways to
recent developments in the PACE controversy. Once again, California has taken the lead with respect to PACE programs. The
state has already amended its PACE statutes in order to codify
stricter underwriting requirements for PACE liens, and some of
the state’s local governments have continued to champion PACE
programs.141 In addition, the FHFA has already voiced its
137. Harris, 2012 WL 3277229, at *16. More specifically, the Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, issued on January 26, 2012, seeks comment
with regard to the restrictions set forth in the FHFA’s July 2010 statement and
February 2011 letter. Id.
138. Id. See Enterprise Underwriting Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 36,086 (proposed June 15, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1254).
139. Paula Melton, Feds Say Popular PACE Retrofit Program Is Still Too Risky,
BUILDINGGREEN.COM (July 17, 2012), http://www.buildinggreen.com/auth/
article.cfm/2012/7/17/Feds-Say-Popular-PACE-Retrofit-Program-Is-Still-TooRisky/?&printable=yes; Enterprise Underwriting Standards, 77 Fed. Reg.
36,086, 36,107 (proposed June 15, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1254).
140. See Harris, 2012 WL 3277229, at *17. David Gabrielson, executive
director of advocacy group PACENow, estimates that a final rule could come
from the FHFA by May 2013. Jim Witkin, For Sacramento, Energy Upgrades With No
Upfront Costs, N.Y. TIMES GREEN BLOG (January 31, 2013, 3:02 PM), http://
green.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/for-sacramento-energy-upgrades-withno-upfront-costs/.
141. Larson, supra note 15, at 627. For instance, Sacramento recently
announced an especially large, ambitious new program called Clean Energy
Sacramento. Jim Witkin, For Sacramento, Energy Upgrades With No Upfront Costs,
N.Y. TIMES GREEN BLOG (January 31, 2013, 3:02 PM), http://green.blogs.
nytimes.com/2013/01/31/for-sacramento-energy-upgrades-with-no-upfrontcosts/. In addition, Riverside County recently announced that its highly successful Home Energy Renovation Opportunity (HERO) Financing PACE pro-
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approval of Vermont’s program, which actually “makes all PACE
liens junior to a mortgage.”142 Maine, New Hampshire, and
Oklahoma “have also rewritten their laws to address FHFA’s concerns” about priority in case of foreclosure.143 Florida, whose
PACE assessments are primarily commercial rather than residential, essentially did just the opposite in 2010 when it adopted a
state law to the effect that PACE assessments are loans equivalent
in priority to base mortgage obligations.144
While the current controversy, highlighted by federal court
decisions and the rulemaking process, leaves the future of PACE
programs far from certain, it does represent an opportunity to
step back and examine more comprehensive means of overcoming the challenges they accentuate and perpetuating their beneficial effects. In a very basic sense, the challenge of coordinating
legislation related to alternative energy and climate change,
including PACE legislation, is an issue of federalism.145 Indeed,
complex networks of federal and state programs and policies
meant to address the same area of concern often result in problematic outcomes because of the conflicting purposes of various
actors.146 Often, state and local governments act to fill gaps and
address areas of weakness in federal legislation.147 “For at least a
decade, states have exercised de facto national leadership on cligram is now available to communities throughout California. Wildly Successful
Residential PACE Program in Riverside County Now Available to Communities throughout California, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/wildly-successful-residential-pace-program-in-riverside-county-nowavailable-to-communities-throughout-california-188983991.html.
142. Melton, supra note 139.
143. Id.
144. Id. (stating a belief that the FHFA’s rule, if finalized, will not cause
problems for the predominantly commercial Florida property owners interested in PACE because the FHFA deals almost exclusively with residential
mortgages).
145. Mann, supra note 6, at 391.
146. Id. at 388 (“Property tax incentives for renewable energy are popular, but some property-tax-related programs are facing failure because of policy
set at the federal level. . . . California Attorney General Jerry Brown sued Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, asking the court to declare that the program known as
[PACE], available in about half of California’s counties, does not violate the
federal lending standards. The Department of Energy invested $150 million in
PACE projects, and a 2009 study showed that energy efficient homes had
default and delinquency rates 11% lower than for typical homes. This is a clear
example of cross-purpose between federal programs and between federal and
state policies.”).
147. Id. at 372; John C. Dernbach et al., Making the States Full Partners in a
National Climate Change Effort: A Necessary Element for Sustainable Economic Development, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,597, 10,599 (2010) (“The high level
of state action on climate change over more than a decade is commonly
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mate change policy development.”148 There are a number of
reasons why some degree of state and local autonomy with
respect to climate change legislation is vitally important, regardless of the strength of federal climate change efforts.149 Among
these reasons is the fact that when states and localities are
granted sufficient autonomy to develop and refine innovative
policies, they can reduce the costs of pursuing regulatory alternative energy goals through frameworks such as those set up by
PACE programs.150 “States are best positioned to identify the
programs that can remove disincentives to implement the most
cost-effective measures to reduce emissions, and develop the
financing and institutional mechanisms that can assist in the
development of those programs.”151 Furthermore, given the
issues of federalism at stake, preserving some degree of state
autonomy with respect to climate change and alternative energy
could make comprehensive federal legislation more palatable to
members of the public and Congress that are concerned about
states’ rights.152 Nevertheless, it is clear that coordination
between federal, state, and local governments is preferable to ad
hoc policymaking for purposes of guarding against conflicts and
inefficiencies.153 Therefore, in order for PACE programs and
similar measures to have a broad and lasting impact, political
leaders must strike an effective balance between state and local
autonomy and coordination between various levels of
government.
An open, collaborative dialogue is necessary in order to
arrive at a viable solution to the PACE controversy that strikes an
effective balance not only with respect to the various levels of
government, but also with respect to the needs of all parties
involved.154 The FHFA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac believe
that the first lien priority of PACE programs severely undermines
traditional mortgage lending practices, likely opening the door
explained as a response to the weak federal effort—a necessary effort to fill a
vacuum.”).
148. Dernbach et al., supra note 147, at 10,597.
149. See id. at 10,601–04 for a list of seven reasons that states must play a
continued and growing role on climate change.
150. Id. at 10,602–03.
151. Id. at 10,606.
152. Id. at 10,604.
153. Mann, supra note 6, at 372 (“When national, state, and local governments all attempt to influence energy use through tax legislation without coordination, inefficiencies and conflicts are bound to arise.”).
154. Wilson et al., supra note 19, at 42 (“A solution will require understanding on both sides of the goals and limitations of the other, and a willingness to work toward a manageable solution for all involved.”).
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to dangerous repercussions.155 Consequently, these entities
firmly hold that significant changes and restrictions are necessary
in order to ensure that PACE programs conform to traditional
mortgage lending practices.156 PACE supporters, on the other
hand, believe that these entities’ concerns are irrational and that
their attempts to stifle the innovation and public benefits represented by PACE are without justification.157 Obviously, the needs
of all parties involved must be adequately reconciled if an effective compromise is to be reached.158
A number of the issues at stake in the current controversy
may appear nearly intractable at first glance.159 Perhaps of foremost importance is the matter of whether PACE financing is
properly characterized as a lien or a loan.160 This distinction is
critical because much of PACE financing’s popularity derives
from its priority over preexisting mortgages, which is in turn
dependent on characterization as a government lien rather than
a loan.161 Notably, the DOE has emphasized that PACE liens
“should not exceed ten percent of any given property’s value,
with a minimum threshold cost of $2500.”162 As long as state and
local governments that implement PACE programs follow this
guideline, the financing they provide will likely remain within
the scope of their historically accepted assessment authority,
avoiding classification as a loan.163 Secondly, there is the matter
of whether PACE financing substantially harms lenders when
property owners default on their mortgages, as claimed by the
FHFA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac.164 In response to this con155. Id. at 39–40.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Elkind, supra note 11 (“Fannie and Freddie’s concerns are
overblown, and they should issue an immediate clarification and retraction.
Federal guidelines for PACE programs already contain numerous safeguards to
prevent losses, and in the event of a foreclosure, the government only gets paid
back on the delinquent PACE payments, not the whole thing. And in any
event, local governments have been using assessments for years for all sorts of
public improvements, and Fannie and Freddie are calling into question that
basic authority. When it comes to public improvements, you can’t get any bigger than fighting climate change.”).
158. Wilson et al., supra note 19, at 42.
159. Larson, supra note 15, at 615.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 615–16.
162. Id. at 617.
163. Id. at 618 (“[A] PACE assessment of twenty years at ten percent of a
property’s value falls well within the boundaries of a state’s historically recognized assessment authority and thus should not be mischaracterized as a ‘loan’
simply by virtue of its size and scope.”).
164. Id. at 610–11.
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cern, PACE supporters have pointed to low default rates on property tax payments, noting that default rates with respect to
property encumbered with PACE liens are often even lower than
their normal counterparts.165 Consequently, they argue that
PACE programs are not likely to have a significant adverse
impact upon mortgage lenders, provided that federally approved
underwriting standards are followed.166
Most proposed solutions to the current controversy involve
measures to bolster underwriting standards for PACE financing.
Some have suggested that in order to secure mortgage lenders’
positions, state and local governments should amend PACE legislation to explicitly codify the underwriting standards that have
been recommended by the DOE.167 Meanwhile, others suggest
that the FHFA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac could resolve the
current controversy by simply agreeing to accept PACE-encumbered mortgages, but only those that comply with certain underwriting standards.168 As mentioned previously, California has
already amended its PACE statutes in order to codify stricter
underwriting requirements for PACE liens.169 Thus, while it
seems that the federal lending entities’ concerns about PACE
programs were intensified by an overwhelming number of distinct state and local laws,170 California’s goal-oriented, innovative
approach further underscores the importance of striking a balance between federal influence and state autonomy with regard
to PACE financing.
165. Id. at 621 (“There is no reason to suspect that the ratio of assessments to defaults will increase substantially from the current level of less than
two percent. For example, in Sonoma County, California, the site of the country’s largest PACE program, there has not been a single default on a PACEencumbered home during its two-year existence; during that same period, however, the default rate for Sonoma County mortgages was seven percent.”).
166. Id. (“In fact, none of the literature or argumentation by PACE critics
has articulated an actualized harm to the industry: the entirety of the criticism
has been based on what could occur, assuming that PACE boards fail to adopt or
adhere to any of the recommended underwriting requirements. For this reason, PACE programs are unlikely to significantly impact lenders as long as federally approved underwriting standards are employed.”).
167. Id. at 626.
168. Id. (“Such a limit on approved PACE loans would sufficiently protect lenders while allowing PACE lending to go forward.”).
169. Id. at 627.
170. Id. at 628 (“Hyper-individualization may account for some part of
the lending authority’s overreaction: as PACE legislation swept the nation, federal lending agencies faced conflicting state-law issues of priority, registration,
and constitutional law, but lacked an effective mechanism for resolving these
issues.”).
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The ideal solution to the PACE controversy would involve
measures that “meet[ ] the needs of mortgage underwriters, the
secondary mortgage markets, and the communities that would
issue supporting bonds yet still promote a simple, accessible
financing platform for individuals and businesses to make clean
energy and energy efficiency investments.”171 Nevertheless, if
efforts directed toward a large-scale compromise ultimately fail,
perhaps leaders should examine possible means of building
upon the most successful aspects of PACE financing, rather than
merely trying to preserve programs that may have already run
their course. While PACE programs are not without their flaws,
they have certainly attracted property owners to invest in alternative energy and helped to organize the market for energy
improvement investments.172 One potential method of improving PACE programs would be for local governments to obtain
administrative funding by conditioning participation in the programs on the payment of more transparent direct fees, rather
than including the costs of program administration in PACE
liens.173 Presumably, greater transparency regarding costs and
funding would make PACE programs even more appealing to
potential participants.174 In addition, PACE programs would be
more appealing if local governments could develop innovative
ways to address not merely the upfront monetary costs of energy
improvements, but the transaction costs, such as the costs related
to finding and selecting an installer,175 that program participants
face when they must determine precisely how to spend the PACE
funding that they receive. Expanding and regionalizing various
existing PACE programs so as to combine lower-income communities with higher-income communities might be one way to
address concerns about adequate funding and the level of participation within lower-income communities.176 Finally, given that
171. Wilson et al., supra note 19, at 42.
172. Cox, supra note 57, at 116 (“Homeowners showed an increased willingness to make energy improvements when the local government solicited
them to participate in an arranged and publicly sanctioned program. This market organization benefit may exist independent of the PACE financing
model.”).
173. Id. at 117 (“Transparency in costs and funding, along with accurate
disclosure and promotion of the consequences of a PACE lien, should be a
principle for developing sustainable residential energy investment programs.”).
174. Id.
175. Eisen, supra note 4, at 88 (“Cities with programs in place have no
municipal installers. So while the city provides the funding to the homeowner,
she is still required to handle legal and technical responsibilities. . . . The real
innovation would be to find a different institutional structure that avoids piecemeal policies and addresses the transaction costs for [homeowners].”).
176. See Wiener & Alexander, supra note 2, at 586–90.
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commercial PACE programs tend to raise fewer concerns from
mortgage lenders, some local governments have simply opted to
shift their focus to encouraging energy improvements on commercial rather than residential property.177
On the other hand, implementing PACE programs in a similar fashion yet on a more modest scale might be another alternative to instituting any kind of broad, fundamental changes. More
modest PACE programs might not be as ambitious or transformative as their predecessors, but they could provide lawmakers with
an opportunity to further analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the PACE financing model in a less problematic context.178 More specifically, PACE programs with smaller
financing179 limits and shorter lien terms would probably be
much more acceptable to federal mortgage lenders, who might
be willing to concede traditional tax lien priority to state and
local governments under these conditions.180 Moreover, in light
of the current controversy, modest, incremental goals may be
more realistic and effective than grand regulatory aspirations.181
The PACE financing model may open the door for similar innovative alternative energy and sustainability programs, but only if
lawmakers are able to resolve the current controversy or devise
effective methods of avoiding the issues that are at its roots.182
IX.

CONCLUSION

The current controversy has left the future of PACE programs mired in doubt and uncertainty. Though its ultimate outcome remains far from certain, it represents an important
opportunity to step back and critically examine the numerous
advantages and disadvantages of PACE programs. A critical
examination reveals that while state and local governments are
best positioned to develop innovative programs like PACE, some
degree of federal influence and authority is necessary to guard
against potential conflicts and inefficiencies. In order for PACE
177. Cox, supra note 57, at 117.
178. Id. at 121.
179. Id. at 120. “The value of the lien priority in permitting broader loan
availability through reduced underwriting might also make more sense in the
context of small loans. Smaller loans reduce the repayment burden on the
homeowner and thus may be less likely to trigger tax forfeiture. Smaller risk
assumption by mortgage lenders with reduced sized PACE financing would
limit the impact on overall mortgage lending criteria or costs charged to borrowers.” Id.
180. Id. at 118 (suggesting that a financing limit of $4,000 and a lien term
of ten years or less might be reasonable solutions).
181. Id. at 121.
182. Wilson et al., supra note 19, at 42.
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programs to be truly successful, lawmakers must strike an effective balance between state and local autonomy and coordination
between the various levels of government. Similarly, lawmakers
must arrive at a compromise that adequately meets the needs of
all parties involved. As many have suggested, it is possible that
the codification of stricter federal underwriting standards would
go a long way toward resolving many of the issues at the root of
the current controversy.
Regardless of their ultimate fate, PACE programs have
already had a significant impact on legislation and regulation
with respect to alternative energy and sustainability throughout
the United States. Even if a large-scale compromise is not readily
attainable, perhaps more modest measures will be sufficient to
perpetuate and build on PACE financing’s most beneficial
aspects. Indeed, it is possible that PACE programs instituted on
a more modest scale with regard to the amount of funding and
the duration of liens could achieve their intended purpose while
largely avoiding the controversial implications of their predecessors. In any case, PACE programs represent an important step in
the march toward a future of increased alternative energy use
and sustainability. At the very least, they will continue to engender fruitful dialogue and encourage innovative thinking and
policymaking with respect to energy issues. In fact, perhaps the
promotion of a political climate characterized by open dialogue
and innovation is more important than any particular policy
development in isolation. After all, given that there is no panacea with regard to alternative energy, each and every instance of
progress is valuable and contributes to the larger goal of a more
sustainable future.

